How prepared is the world? Identifying weaknesses in existing assessment frameworks for global health security through a One Health approach.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed faults in the way we assess preparedness and response capacities for public health emergencies. Existing frameworks are limited in scope, and do not sufficiently consider complex social, economic, political, regulatory, and ecological factors. One Health, through its focus on the links among humans, animals, and ecosystems, is a valuable approach through which existing assessment frameworks can be analysed and new ways forward proposed. Although in the past few years advances have been made in assessment tools such as the International Health Regulations Joint External Evaluation, a rapid and radical increase in ambition is required. To sufficiently account for the range of complex systems in which health emergencies occur, assessments should consider how problems are defined across stakeholders and the wider sociopolitical environments in which structures and institutions operate. Current frameworks do little to consider anthropogenic factors in disease emergence or address the full array of health security hazards across the social-ecological system. A complex and interdependent set of challenges threaten human, animal, and ecosystem health, and we cannot afford to overlook important contextual factors, or the determinants of these shared threats. Health security assessment frameworks should therefore ensure that the process undertaken to prioritise and build capacity adheres to core One Health principles and that interventions and outcomes are assessed in terms of added value, trade-offs, and cobenefits across human, animal, and environmental health systems.

Implementing an emergency risk communication campaign in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria: lessons learned.

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the WHO recommended the prioritisation of risk communication and community engagement as part of response activities in countries. This was related to the increasing spread of misinformation and its associated risks, as well as the need to promote non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) in the absence of an approved vaccine for disease prevention. The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, the national public health institute with the mandate to prevent and detect infectious disease outbreaks, constituted a multidisciplinary Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), which included NCDC staff and partners to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak. Risk communication, which also comprised crisis communication, was a pillar in the EOC. As the number of cases in Nigeria increased, the increasing spread of misinformation and poor compliance to NPIs inspired the development of the #TakeResponsibility campaign, to encourage individual and collective behavioural change and to foster a shared ownership of the COVID-19 outbreak response. Mass media, social media platforms and community engagement measures were used as part of the campaign. This contributed to the spread of messages using diverse platforms and voices, collaboration with community leaders to contextualise communication materials and empowerment of communication officers at local levels through training, for increased impact. Despite the challenges faced in implementing the campaign, lessons such as the use of data and a participatory approach in developing communications campaigns for disease outbreaks were documented. This paper describes how a unique communication campaign was developed to support the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Impact of a Newly Established Revolving Outbreak Investigation Fund on Timeliness of Response to Public Health Emergencies in Nigeria.

Timely access to emergency funding has been identified as a bottleneck for outbreak response in Nigeria. In February 2019, a new revolving outbreak investigation fund (ROIF) was established by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC). We abstracted the date of NCDC notification, date of verification, and date of response for 25 events that occurred prior to establishing the fund (April 2017 to August 2019) and for 8 events that occurred after establishing the fund (February to October 2019). The median time to notification (1 day) and to verification (0 days) did not change after establishing the ROIF, but the median time to response significantly decreased, from 6 days to 2 days (P = .003). Response to disease outbreaks was accelerated by access to emergency funding with a clear approval process. We recommend that the ROIF should be financed by the national government through budget allocation. Finally, development partners can provide financial support for the existing fund and technical assistance for protocol development toward financial accountability and sustainability.

Reviewing Health Security Capacities in Nigeria Using the Updated WHO Joint External Evaluation and WHO Benchmarks Tool: Experience from a Country-Led Self-Assessment Exercise.

Across the world, the level of pandemic preparedness varies and no country is fully prepared to respond to all public health events. The International Health Regulations 2005 require state parties to develop core capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to public health events of international concern. In addition to annual self-assessment, these capacities are peer reviewed once every 5 years through the voluntary Joint External Evaluation (JEE). In this article, we share Nigeria's experience of conducting a country-led midterm self-assessment using a slightly modified application of the second edition of the World Health Organization (WHO) JEE and the new WHO benchmarks tool. Despite more stringent scoring criteria in the revised JEE tool, average scoring showed modest capacity improvements in 2019 compared with 2017. Of the 19 technical areas assessed, 11 improved, 5 did not change, and 3 had lower scores. No technical area attained the highest-level scoring of 5. Understanding the level of, and gaps in, pandemic preparedness enables state parties to develop plans to improve health security; the outcome of the assessment included the development of a 12-month operational plan. Countries need to intentionally invest in preparedness by using existing frameworks (eg, JEE) to better understand the status of their preparedness. This will ensure ownership of developed plans with shared responsibilities by all key stakeholders across all levels of government.

The One Health approach to incident management of the 2019 Lassa fever outbreak response in Nigeria.

Globally, effective emergency response to disease outbreaks is usually affected by weak coordination. However, coordination using an incident management system (IMS) in line with a One Health approach involving human, environment, and animal health with collaborations between government and non-governmental agencies result in improved response outcome for zoonotic diseases such as Lassa fever (LF). We provide an overview of the 2019 LF outbreak response in Nigeria using the IMS and One Health approach. The response was coordinated via ten Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) response pillars. Cardinal response activities included activation of EOC, development of an incident action plan, deployment of One Health rapid response teams to support affected states, mid-outbreak review and after-action review meetings. Between 1st January and 29th December 2019, of the 5057 people tested for LF, 833 were confirmed positive from 23 States, across 86 Local Government Areas. Of the 833 confirmed cases, 650 (78%) were from hotspot States of Edo (36%), Ondo (26%) and Ebonyi (16%). Those in the age-group 21-40 years (47%) were mostly affected, with a male to female ratio of 1:1. Twenty healthcare workers were affected. Two LF naïve states Kebbi and Zamfara, reported confirmed cases for the first time during this period. The outbreak peaked earlier in the year compared to previous years, and the emergency phase of the outbreak was declared over by epidemiological week 17 based on low national threshold composite indicators over a period of six consecutive weeks. Multisectoral and multidisciplinary strategic One Health EOC coordination at all levels facilitated the swift containment of Nigeria's large LF outbreak in 2019. It is therefore imperative to embrace One Health approach embedded within the EOC to holistically address the increasing LF incidence in Nigeria.

Building local capacity for emergency coordination: establishment of subnational Public Health Emergency Operations Centres in Nigeria.

Public Health Emergency Operations Centres (PHEOCs) provide a platform for multisectoral coordination and collaboration, to enhance the efficiency of outbreak response activities and enable the control of disease outbreaks. Over the last decade, PHEOCs have been introduced to address the gaps in outbreak response coordination. With its tropical climate, high population density and poor socioeconomic indicators, Nigeria experiences large outbreaks of infectious diseases annually. These outbreaks have led to mortality and negative economic impact as a result of large disparities in healthcare and poor coordination systems. Nigeria is a federal republic with a presidential system of government and a separation of powers among the three tiers of government which are the federal, state and local governments. There are 36 states in Nigeria, and as with other countries with a federal system of governance, each state in Nigeria has its budgets, priorities and constitutional authority for health sector interventions including the response to disease outbreaks. Following the establishment of a National PHEOC in 2017 to improve the coordination of public health emergencies, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control began the establishment of State PHEOCs. Using a defined process, the establishment of State PHEOCs has led to improved coordination, coherence of thoughts among public health officials, government ownership, commitment and collaboration. This paper aims to share the experience and importance of establishing PHEOCs at national and subnational levels in Nigeria and the lessons learnt which can be used by other countries considering the use of PHEOCs in managing complex emergencies.

Evaluating an institutional health partnership using the ESTHER EFFECt tool: A case study of an evaluation of the institutional health partnership between Nigeria CDC and Public Health England.

Objectives: Bilateral Institutional Health Partnerships (IHPs) are a means of strengthening health systems and are becoming increasing prevalent in global health. Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) and Public Health England (PHE) have engaged in one such IHP as part of Public Health England's International Health Regulations Strengthening project. Presently, there have been limited evaluations of IHPs resulting in limited evidence of their effectiveness in strengthening health systems despite the concept being used across the world. Study design: Qualitative, using a validated tool. Methods: The ESTHER EFFECt tool was used to evaluate the IHP between NCDC and PHE. Senior leadership from both organisations participated in a two-day workshop where their perceptions of various elements of the partnership were evaluated. This was done through an initial quantitative survey followed by a facilitated discussion to further explore any arising issues. Results: This evaluation is the first published evaluation of a bilateral global health partnership undertaken by NCDC and PHE. NCDC scores were consistently higher than PHE scores. Key strengths and weaknesses of the partnership were identified such as having wide ranging institutional engagement, however needing to improve dissemination mechanisms following key learning activity. Conclusions: There is a dearth of evidence measuring the effectiveness of international health partnerships; of the studies that exist, many are lacking in academic rigour. We used the ESTHER EFFECt tool as it is an established method of evaluating the progress of the partnership, with multiple previous peer-reviewed publications. This will hopefully encourage more organisations to publish evaluations of their international health partnerships and build the evidence base.

What are the drivers of recurrent cholera transmission in Nigeria? Evidence from a scoping review.

BACKGROUND: The 2018 cholera outbreak in Nigeria affected over half of the states in the country, and was characterised by high attack and case fatality rates. The country continues to record cholera cases and related deaths to date. However, there is a dearth of evidence on context-specific drivers and their operational mechanisms in mediating recurrent cholera transmission in Nigeria. This study therefore aimed to fill this important research gap, with a view to informing the design and implementation of appropriate preventive and control measures. METHODS: Four bibliographic literature sources (CINAHL (Plus with full text), Web of Science, Google Scholar and PubMed), and one journal (African Journals Online) were searched to retrieve documents relating to cholera transmission in Nigeria. Titles and abstracts of the identified documents were screened according to a predefined study protocol. Data extraction and bibliometric analysis of all eligible documents were conducted, which was followed by thematic and systematic analyses. RESULTS: Forty-five documents met the inclusion criteria and were included in the final analysis. The majority of the documents were peer-reviewed journal articles (89%) and conducted predominantly in the context of cholera epidemics (64%). The narrative analysis indicates that social, biological, environmental and climatic, health systems, and a combination of two or more factors appear to drive cholera transmission in Nigeria. Regarding operational dynamics, a substantial number of the identified drivers appear to be functionally interdependent of each other. CONCLUSION: The drivers of recurring cholera transmission in Nigeria are diverse but functionally interdependent; thus, underlining the importance of adopting a multi-sectoral approach for cholera prevention and control.

Nigeria's Joint External Evaluation and National Action Plan for Health Security.

Nigeria is working to protect against and respond more effectively to disease outbreaks. Quick mobilization and control of the Ebola epidemic in 2014, at least 4 major domestic outbreaks each year, and significant progress toward polio eradication led to adoption of the World Health Organization's Global Health Security Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS). The process required joint assessment and planning among many agencies, ministries, and sectors over the past 2 years. We carried out a JEE of 19 core programs in 2017 and launched a detailed NAPHS to improve prevention, detection, and response in December 2018, which required us to create topic-specific groups to document work to date and propose JEE scores. We then met with an international team for 5 days to review and revise scoring and recommendations, created a 5-year implementation plan, developed a management team to oversee implementation, drafted legislation to manage outbreaks, trained professionals at state and local levels of government, and set priorities among the many possible activities recommended. Management software and leadership skills were developed to monitor global health security programs. We learned to use international assistance strategically to strengthen planning and mentor national staff. Finally, a review of every major disease outbreak was used to prepare for the next challenge. Review and adaptation of this plan each year will be critical to ensure sustained momentum and progress. Many low-income countries are skilled at managing vertical disease control programs. Balancing and combining the 19 core activities of a country's public health system is a more demanding challenge.

Identifying and quantifying the factors associated with cholera-related death during the 2018 outbreak in Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION: cholera outbreaks in Nigeria are often associated with high case fatality rates; however, there is a dearth of evidence on context-specific factors associated with the trend. This study therefore aimed to identify and quantify the factors associated with cholera-related deaths in Nigeria. METHODS: using a cross-sectional design, we analysed surveillance data from all the States that reported cholera cases during the 2018 outbreak, and defined cholera-related death as death of an individual classified as having cholera according to the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control case definition. Factors associated with cholera-related death were assessed using multivariable logistic regression and findings presented as adjusted odds ratios (ORs) with 95% Confidence Intervals (95% CIs). RESULTS: between January 1 and November 19, 2018, 41,394 cholera cases were reported across 20 States, including 815 cholera-related deaths. In the adjusted multivariable model, older age, male gender, living in peri-urban areas or in flooded states, infection during the rainy season, and delay in seeking health care by >2 days were positively associated with cholera-related death; whereas living in urban areas, hospitalisation in the course of illness, and presentation to a secondary hospital were negatively associated with cholera-related death. CONCLUSION: cholera-related deaths during the 2018 outbreak in Nigeria appeared to be driven by multiple factors, which further reemphasises the importance of adopting a multisectoral approach to the design and implementation of context-specific interventions in Nigeria.

Descriptive epidemiology of cholera outbreak in Nigeria, January-November, 2018: implications for the global roadmap strategy.

BACKGROUND: The cholera outbreak in 2018 in Nigeria reaffirms its public health threat to the country. Evidence on the current epidemiology of cholera required for the design and implementation of appropriate interventions towards attaining the global roadmap strategic goals for cholera elimination however seems lacking. Thus, this study aimed at addressing this gap by describing the epidemiology of the 2018 cholera outbreak in Nigeria. METHODS: This was a retrospective analysis of surveillance data collected between January 1st and November 19th, 2018. A cholera case was defined as an individual aged 2 years or older presenting with acute watery diarrhoea and severe dehydration or dying from acute watery diarrhoea. Descriptive analyses were performed and presented with respect to person, time and place using appropriate statistics. RESULTS: There were 43,996 cholera cases and 836 cholera deaths across 20 states in Nigeria during the outbreak period, with an attack rate (AR) of 127.43/100,000 population and a case fatality rate (CFR) of 1.90%. Individuals aged 15 years or older (47.76%) were the most affected age group, but the proportion of affected males and females was about the same (49.00 and 51.00% respectively). The outbreak was characterised by four distinct epidemic waves, with higher number of deaths recorded in the third and fourth waves. States from the north-west and north-east regions of the country recorded the highest ARs while those from the north-central recorded the highest CFRs. CONCLUSION: The severity and wide-geographical distribution of cholera cases and deaths during the 2018 outbreak are indicative of an elevated burden, which was more notable in the northern region of the country. Overall, the findings reaffirm the strategic role of a multi-sectoral approach in the design and implementation of public health interventions aimed at preventing and controlling cholera in Nigeria.

Time delays in the response to the Neisseria meningitidis serogroup C outbreak in Nigeria - 2017.

BACKGROUND: Nigeria reports high rates of mortality linked with recurring meningococcal meningitis outbreaks within the African meningitis belt. Few studies have thoroughly described the response to these outbreaks to provide strong and actionable public health messages. We describe how time delays affected the response to the 2016/2017 meningococcal meningitis outbreak in Nigeria. METHODS: Using data from Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA), World Health Organisation (WHO), and situation reports of rapid response teams, we calculated attack and death rates of reported suspected meningococcal meningitis cases per week in Zamfara, Sokoto and Yobe states respectively, between epidemiological week 49 in 2016 and epidemiological week 25 in 2017. We identified when alert and epidemic thresholds were crossed and determined when the outbreak was detected and notified in each state. We examined response activities to the outbreak. RESULTS: There were 12,535 suspected meningococcal meningitis cases and 877 deaths (CFR: 7.0%) in the three states. It took an average time of three weeks before the outbreaks were detected and notified to NCDC. Four weeks after receiving notification, an integrated response coordinating centre was set up by NCDC and requests for vaccines were sent to International Coordinating Group (ICG) on vaccine provision. While it took ICG one week to approve the requests, it took an average of two weeks for approximately 41% of requested vaccines to arrive. On the average, it took nine weeks from the date the epidemic threshold was crossed to commencement of reactive vaccination in the three states. CONCLUSION: There were delays in detection and notification of the outbreak, in coordinating response activities, in requesting for vaccines and their arrival from ICG, and in initiating reactive vaccination. Reducing these delays in future outbreaks could help decrease the morbidity and mortality linked with meningococcal meningitis outbreaks.